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NOTES AND COMMENT
SILENCE IN FACE OF INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS AS AN

ADMISSION OF GUILT.
In a recent case, the question arose whether evidence of silence
while under arrest when incriminating statements were made in his
presence by a co-defendant, was admissible as an admission of the
truth of such statements to establish such defendant's guilty participation in a conspiracy. The Court of Appeals," reversing the
Appellate Division,2 held, that a person under arrest jointly with
another person, is. not called upon to contradict statements prejudicial to him, made in his presence by the other person in answer to
inquiries made by an officer, and that such statements, though not
contradicted by him, are not admissible in evidence against him.
The situation may arise where silence may spell out an admission. As a general proposition, where a statement is made in
the presence of party under such circumstances that the party would
ordinarily and naturally reply unless he admitted the truth of the
statement, such statement together with the fact of his silence will
be received in evidence as an admission of its truth.8 This rule
admitting such evidence, however, is applied with careful discrimination. Such evidence has been held to be most dangerous and
should be received with great caution, and not admitted unless of
statements or acts which naturally call for contradiction or unless
it consists of some assertion with respect to his rights in which, by
silence, the party plainly acquiesces. The circumstances must not
only be such as to afford him an opportunity to speak or act, but
such as would ordinarily and naturally call for some action or reply
from persons similarly situated. If the case is a doubtful one as
to whether a reply should have been made, the evidence should not
be received. 4 In People v. Kennedy,5 the Court stated:
"There are circumstances under which the declaration of
persons made in the presence of the accused are competent,
but they should not be admitted unless the evidence clearly
brings them within the rule. Declarations or statements made
in the presence of a party are not received as evidence in
themselves, but for the purpose of ascertaining the reply of
the party to be affected makes to them."
Dolce, 261 N. Y. 108, 184 N. E. 690 (1933).
2236 App, Div. 574, 260 N. Y. Supp. 32 (1st Dept. 1932).
'Commonwealth v. Kenney, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 235, 46 Am. Dec. 572
(1847) ; RIcHARrsoN, EVIDENCE (4th ed.) §363; see also Wallace v. Wallace,
216 N. Y. 28, 109 N. E. 872 (1915); Cohen v. Toole, 184 App. Div. 70, 171
'People v.

N. Y. Supp. 577 (1st Dept. 1918).
'People v. Koerner, 154 N. Y. 355, 48 N. E. 730 (1897) ; People v. Kennedy,
164 N. Y. 449, 58 N. E. 652 (1900) ; People v. Smith, 172 N. Y. 210, 64 N. E.
814 (1902).
r Ibid.
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In the case of People v. Cascone,6 the Court restated the principles laid down in People v. Kennedy and People v. Smith,7 and
held that evidence of silence in the face of accusatory statements
were inadmissible and could constitute no admission against one
where he was accused in a language he did not understand and he
did not know he was being accused. In People v. Willett 8 upon
a trial of an indictment for murder, the Court received evidence to
the effect that upon the coroner's inquest, a witness had pointed out
the defendant and had made accusatory statements concerning him,
which the defendant did not deny. Upon appeal, it was held that
this evidence was improperly received, holding that since the proceedings were of a judicial character, the defendant was not bound
to speak, and evidence of silence was therefore inadmissible. The
Court stated: "The doctrine as to silence being taken as an implied admission of the truth of allegations spoken or uttered in the
presence of a person, does not apply to silence at a judicial proceeding or hearing." In People v. Conrow 9 it was held that it was
error to admit evidence of silence of the accused where he refused
to answer by advice of counsel, the Court holding that under such
circumstances, the defendant was under no duty to speak. People
v. Koerner 10 raised the question as to the admissibility of evidence
of a conversation had between the doctor and a police officer in
the presence of the defendant while he was apparently unconscious,
in which he was charged with "shamming." The Court held that
such evidence was inadmissible, irrespective of the question of
whether or not the defendant was in fact unconscious at the time.
Martin, J., laid down the following test:
"A more serious difficulty, however, arises, when we consider whether even if the defendant understood what the witness said, there was any presumption of acquiescence to be
drawn from his silence. Were the circumstances such as
not only afforded the defendant an opportunity to act or
speak, but were they. also such as would properly and naturally call for some action or reply from persons similarly
situated? If not, then clearly, the evidence was improper.
The statement of the witness was to the effect that the defendant was feigning unconsciousness. Under the circumstances, was a reply to that statement naturally to be expected? If he was unconscious, none could have been made.
If he was not, but was feigning unconsciousness, naturally
neither he nor any other person similarly situated would have
replied. It is impossible upon any theory to justify this ruling. We think it was error."
N. Y. 317, 78 N. E. 287 (1906).
'Supra note 4.
o 185

892 N. Y. 29 (1883).

9200 N. Y. 356, 93 N. E. 943 (1911).
'0Supra note 4.
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In the light of the above test, the following question presents
itself: whether the fact that the accused is under arrest at the time
the statements are made is such a circumstance as will take the case
out of the general rule. Is it such a circumstance as will relieve
the defendant of the duty to deny the accusations made in his presence? In the present case, the Appellate Division in affirming the
ruling admitting the evidence relied entirely upon the case of Kelley
v. People." In the latter case, the Court held that evidence of
silence of the accused after arrest, in face of charges, was admissible, broadly laying down the rule that: "It is no objection to the
admission of the declarations of the accused, as evidence, that they
are made while he is under arrest, and his admission either express
or implied, of the truth of a statement made by others under the
same circumstances is equally admissible. His conduct and acts,
as well when in custody, as when at large, may be given in evidence
against him and their cogency as evidence will be determined by
the jury." 12 In its later decisions, there is seen the gradual tendency
of the Court of Appeals to break away from this holding. Opposed
to the Kelley case, we have People v. Smith 13 and People v.
Marendi.14 In the former, the Court in discussing the admissibility
of such evidence after arrest, said: "Moreover, he was at the time
under arrest and in the custody of an officer and might well have
been silent without it being regarded as an acquiescence to any act
proved to have been performed," the Court citing Commonwealth
v. McDermott"5 as authority for the proposition. Following the
Snith case, the Court in People v. Marendi said: "Even if he
had stood mute his silence could not have been construed as an admission because he was then under arrest and not called upon to
speak or deny an accusation."
In People v. Rutigliano,16 decided simultaneously with the present
case, Pound, Ch. J., writing for a unanimous court, approved the
rulings in the Smith and Marendi cases and flatly rejected the holding of the Kelley case and adopted the dicta of these later cases:
"To avoid confusion, we must take it that New York has adopted
the Massachusetts rule. * * * It is a wise rule. * * * No cautious

person when in custody. accused of crime, would care to enter into
a discussion of his guilt or innocence with his captors and co55 N. Y. 565 (1874). A consideration of the cases cited by Allen, J., in
the Kelley case reveals that none are authority for the proposition that evidence
of mere silence under such circumstances is admissible. In each case, the
accused either testified, confessed, or denied his guilt. There was in each
instance an affirmative act by the accused. 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (15th ed.)
275; see also dissenting opinion of Jenks, P.1., in People v. Cascia, 191 App.
Div. 376, 181 N. Y. Supp. 855 (2d Dept. 1920).
"See also People v. Cascia, ibid., where the Court felt bound to follow
the holding of the Kelley case.
3Supra note 4.
14213 N. Y. 600, 107 N. E. 1058 (1915).
123 Mass. 440, 25 Am. Rep. 120 (1877).
16261 N. Y. 103, 184 N. E. 689 (1933).
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defendants when what he said may be used against him." This
holding, however, is merely dicta, the judgment of conviction being
affirmed on the ground that subsequent confessions were sufficient
to sustain the conviction. In the present case, the Court, in reversing the Appellate Division, adopted the principle it stated in
the Rutigliano case and a reversal was had on that ground.
Whether this latter decision has in effect overruled the Kelley
case, as it purports to do, may indeed be questioned. It is submitted that the rules laid down in the Rutigliano and in the present
case are too broad and unnecessary for the decision of the question therein involved. The Rutigliano case is admittedly dicta. As
to the present case, it should be noted that the accusatory statements which the defendant left unanswered were not made by a victim of the accused or by a police officer as is usually the situation
in cases where this question has been raised. The accused remained
silent to statements made by an alleged co-conspirator. What then
is the effect of this added circumstance? Independently of the question of whether silence constituted an admission, the question is
raised whether the statements of the accused's co-defendant are binding upon him at all and therefore admissible.
Having been made after arrest they were, of course, made after
the common design of the parties was either accomplished or abandoned. In such instances, the rule is that acts, confessions and
declarations of a conspirator are admissible and binding upon his
fellow conspirator only when made during the conduct of the conspiracy. The theory of the law is that in the course of a conspiracy,
each act made or done by a conspirator is in furtherance of the purpose of the conspiracy and therefore admissible against all members of the conspiracy. But where the admissions of one conspirator are made after this common design has been abandoned, they
are inadmissible since they were not made in furtherance of this
17
common object and do not constitute part of the res gestae.
Or if it be claimed that there was no previous evidence of a conspiracy and such incriminating statements of the co-defendant tended
to involve the defendant and connect him with the conspiracy, such
evidence is inadmissible, the rule being that the declarations of an
alleged conspirator cannot be received for the purpose of proving
the conspiracy.' 8 Viewed from either angle, the incriminating statements made by the co-defendant were inadmissible since they were
not binding upon this defendant.
It is thus seen that the evidence in the present case was inadmissible because of the fact that the statements were made by an alleged co-conspirator. It was entirely unnecessary for the Court to
base its decision on the broad ground that the evidence was inad17RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE (4th ed.) supra note 3, §383; People v. Davis, 56
N. Y. 95 (1874) ; Garnsey v. Rhodes, 138 N. Y. 461, 34 N. E. 199 (1893);
People v. Storrs, 207 N. Y. 147, 100 N. E. 730 (1912).
" Cuyler v. McCartney, 40 N. Y. 221 (1869); Lent v. Shear, 160 N. Y.
462, 55 N. E. 2 (1899).
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missible because the resulting silence occurred after arrest. It is
therefore this writer's opinion that the rule laid down in the present case, like that of the Rutigliano case, is only dicta.
It is, however, well considered dicta, and is in accordance with
of this state in
the inevitable trend of the decisions of the courts
rule of the Kelley case, 19 and adopting the
gradually rejecting 2the
0
Massachusetts rule.
There is a wide divergence of judicial opinion among the various states as to the effect of the accused being under arrest at the
time the accusation is made. In some jurisdictions it is held that
the mere fact of arrest alone is not sufficient to render the evidence
inadmissible, but that such fact deserves consideration only as one
of the circumstances under which the accusation was made, in determining whether the accused was afforded an opportunity to deny
and whether he was naturally called upon to do So. 2 1 In other
states, it is held that the fact of arrest alone is sufficient to render
inadmissible the fact of the accused's failure to deny the accusatory
statements made in his presence and hearing. These cases maintain that it is the common knowledge and belief of men in general
that silence while under arrest is most conducive
22 to the welfare
of an accused whether he be guilty or innocent.
This state is drifting towards what we believe to be the more
logical rule. As stated above, such evidence is cautiously guarded
and the slightest circumstances have been seized upon as ground for
excluding such evidence. Where there is the least restraint upon
the accused, the evidence has been held inadmissible. It is submitted that the fact that the accused was under arrest at the time is
such a circumstance. Such implied admission of truth can result
only when the circumstances are such as afford an opportunity to
speak and would naturally call for some reply from a person similarly situated. After arrest, the accused has the undoubted right
to remain silent as to the crime and should not be called upon to
reply or contradict such statement. 23 Without an opportunity to
"0 Supra note 11.
People v. McDermott, supra note 15.

People v. Amaya, 134 Cal. 531, 66 Pac. 794 (1901) ; State v. Booker, 68

W. Va. 8, 69 S. E. 295 (1910) ; People v. Courtney, 178 Mich. 137, 144 N. W.
568 (1913); Simmon v. State, 7 Ala. App. 107, 61 So. 466 (1913); State v.
Won, 76 Mont. 509, 248 Pac. 201 (1926) ; Rierson v. Commonwealth, 229 Ky.
584, 17 S. W. (2d) 697 (1929). But see Hayden v. Comm., 140 Ky. 634,

131 S. W. 521 (1910) ; State v. Porter, 200 N. C. 142, 156 S. E. 783 (1931).
People v. McDermott, sufira note 15; State v. Diskin, 34 La. Ann. 919,
44 Am. Rep. 448 (1882) ; State v. Epstein, 25 R. I. 131, 55 Atl. 204 (1903);

O'Hearn v. State, 79 Neb. 513, 113 N. W. 130 (1907); Vaughan v. State, 7
Okla. Crim. Rep. 685, 127 Pac. 264 (1911) ; Johnson v. State, 151 Ga. 21, 105
S. E. 603 (1921)'; State v. Ferrone, 97 Conn. 258, 116 AtI. 336 (1922) ; State v.
Hester, 137 S. C. 145, 134 S. E. 885 (1926).
11State v. Diskin, ibid.
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consult counsel, beset by fears and ignorant as to the proper course
to pursue, can it be denied that the most natural thing for the
accused to do under such circumstances is to keep silent?
RUBIN BARON.

A

FORWARD

STEP IN

LABOR REGULATION.

At the start of the present year Justice Cotillo in Special Term
of the New York County Supreme Court named three receivers to
manage the affairs of Local 306 of the Motion Picture Operators'
Union of Greater New York. This appointment came about as
the result of charges of mismanagement of the Local by its parent
organization, which was in control of the local by virtue of the
lawful exercise of the right of suspension of local officers in an
emergency.' The board was appointed by the court for a twofold
purpose: "(1) To have custody of the funds of the union and to
control its expenditures, with full recognition of its financial obligations to the superior union, and (2) to supervise the rights of
individual members in their relation to the union and in the preservation of their contractual rights." 2
This decision will be welcomed by those who regret-the attitude of laissez-faire which has been adopted by the New York
courts dealing with certain problems of labor. 3 The essential idea
of laissez-faire consists in setting aside all interference (in theory
at least) of government and all artificial control of groups within
the state. It is not within the scope of this note to probe deeply
into the fallacies of this principle. We think the present world-wide
depression coming at the end of a period of rugged individualism
is an adequate indictment. The author is in accord with the principles of that great Christian teacher Leo XIII, 4 that:
"Laws, institutions, and administration must aim at public well-being as well as private property rights. A just
freedom of action is only valid as long as the common good
is secured and no injustice entailed. Whenever the general
interest of any particular class suffers, or is threatened with
'Kaplan v. Elliot, 145 Misc. 863, 261 N. Y. Supp. 112 (1932).
2 These purposes were laid down in an opinion, denying a motion for reargument of the appointment, Kaplan v. Elliot, N. Y. L. J., January 5, 1933, at 57.
The original order is reported in Kaplan v. Elliot, N. Y. L. J., December 28,
1932, at 3015.
'Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927) ; Stillwell v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932); Note (1932) 7 Sr. JOHN'S
L. REv. 68.
'LEO

(1892).
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